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On the Banality of Willful Blindness:  
Ignorance and Affect in Extractive Encounters  
Unpublished review copy 
Judith Bovensiepen (University of Kent)  
Responding to criticisms of a controversial mega oil infrastructure scheme initiated in 2011, 
employees of Timor-Leste’s national oil company maintained that they were ‘just doing their 
job’ by implementing a government plan. The so-called Tasi Mane project is a gigantic state-
led development scheme that is aimed at building a petroleum infrastructure along Timor-
Leste’s south coast, including artificially designed cities and a 160-km-long highway. The 
project has fuelled a range of criticisms, from it being economically unviable, socially and 
environmentally damaging, to it compounding the adverse effects of oil dependency. It was 
remarkable to see that many professionals working in the oil company were aware of these 
critiques, even agreed with many of them, yet in crucial moments of interaction with residents 
affected by the infrastructure, they appeared to switch off this awareness and supported the 
project.1   
How, then, do people manage to detach themselves from uncomfortable knowledge or 
concerns about the consequences of their actions? How is ignorance created in the self and in 
others? The topic of non-knowledge has gained increasing attention in recent years, with 
scholars pointing out that ignorance, not just knowledge, can be a powerful political resource 
and technique of governance. Whilst this is a crucially important insight, the emphasis on the 
role of ignorance as a tool for the wielding of political power only captures one dimension of 
willful blindness – its most strategic aspect. Less attention has been paid to the ‘banal’ 
workings of willful blindness, to how it can become a normalised part of corporate or state 
governance.  
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Examining various instantiations of willful blindness in the history, planning and 
implementation of the Tasi Mane project in Timor-Leste, this article suggests that in most 
cases, doubts or concerns were ignored for rather ‘banal’ reasons, not because they were part 
of an ill-intentioned master plan. Ignorance emerges not just as ‘strategy’ (see also Stein, 2020, 
this issue), but also as a form of ‘praxis’ (Anandt, 2015: 309). Here I follow Hannah Arendt’s 
(1994[1963]) use of the term ‘banal’, describing ordinary and routine actions that are not 
reflected on even when they can have serious (even horrific) consequences. However, in 
contrast to Arendt’s description of the cold rationality of bureaucratic processes, I also show 
that these dynamics are not necessarily detached from emotive states, and thus I seek to draw 
out the affective dimensions of how willful blindness can be normalised.  
I do this first, by discussing some key approaches in the growing literature on the 
production of ignorance, pointing out that the over-emphasis on the ‘strategic’ nature of 
ignorance tends to give the impression of stability, thereby underestimating its internal fragility 
and the significance of affect in the maintenance of non-knowledge. This is not to deny that 
willful blindness in Timor-Leste can be strategic – I will discuss ‘strategic denial’ when 
analysing the history and geopolitical context of the Tasi Mane project. However, this analysis 
must be expanded by an examination of less strategic normalisations of willful blindness – for 
example through spatial, emotive, and epistemic disconnect between those implementing the 
project and those affected by it. This will be followed by a consideration of how pragmatic 
reasoning and affective states are interwoven so as to allow oil company employees – in key 
moments – to suppress the doubts they have about the infrastructure scheme. An investigation 
of the various forms of ignorance at play in Timor-Leste’s oil industry, allows me to develop 
the concept of willful blindness beyond its strategic use.  
 
Willful blindness beyond strategy  
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Apart from philosophy, history of science was one of the first disciplines to take the study of 
ignorance seriously, and to highlight the connection between non-knowledge and power. As a 
counter-part to ‘epistemology’, Proctor (2008: 27) coined the term ‘agnotology’ to describe the 
study of the production of ignorance, focusing primarily on the role of ignorance in the study 
of science. Whilst agnotology recognises the diverse forms ignorance can take (Proctor 2008: 
4), Proctor’s initial interest in ignorance stems from his analysis of how the tobacco industry 
deliberately manufactured doubt about the hazards of smoking (Proctor, 2008: 11; see also 
Kirsch, 2020, this issue). This led to a more broadly conceived examination of how the private 
sector uses science strategically to manufacture ignorance, for example about climate change.  
The study of ignorance has since gained significant attention in sociology and, more 
recently, anthropology. As we indicated in the introduction, two key ideas re-appear in this 
burgeoning field of study. First, there is the argument about the ‘creative’ powers (Højer, 2015: 
575; Pedersen, 2017: 88) or ‘generative effects’ of ignorance (McGoey, 2007: 11). Ignorance 
is not just a ‘void’ (Proctor, 2008: 2), not the inverse or binary opposite of knowledge, but ‘its 
ally and twin, amplifying itself indefinitely in tandem with the development of new “truths”’ 
(Davies and McGoey, 2012: 79, drawing on Nietzsche 1973; see also Mair et al., 2012: 16; 
Kirsch and Dilley, 2015: 4; Chua, 2009). As Kirsch and Dilley (2015: 4) put it, in order to 
avoid reifying ignorance as a ‘thing’ or ‘being’, it needs to be understood as ‘more than just a 
residual category of ‘knowledge’ but something that has palpable effects in the world’. The 
effects of ignorance can be both negative and positive, or even ‘virtuous’ (Proctor, 2008: 4; 
Mair et al., 2012: 18).  
Rather than seeking to define what exactly constitutes ignorance and related forms of 
‘nonknowledge’, McGoey stresses that we should examine the production of ignorance, its 
political and social effects, and ‘the constant policing of boundaries between the known and 
the unknown’ (McGoey, 2007: 13; see also Proctor, 2008: 3). I would like to add to this that 
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there is a need to pay attention not just to the ways in which the production of ignorance and 
knowledge intersect, but also to changing levels of intentionality in relation to ignorance, to 
the rhythms that allow it to ebb and flow, and to the emotive states that boost, maintain or 
undermine diverse forms of willful blindness.  
The second key idea that re-appears in the growing agnotology literature is based on an 
expansion of the Foucauldian analytical perspective that associates knowledge and power. In 
contradistinction to Foucault, scholars have emphasised that ignorance can be an equally 
powerful tool for governance (e.g., Anand, 2015: 309; Graeber, 2015: 55; Mathews, 2005; 
Kirsch and Dilley, 2015: 23; McGoey, 2007: 1, 8), or a source of ‘symbolic capital’ (Gherson 
and Raj, 2000: 3), and that studying the production of ignorance can help to formulate a 
political critique of relations of power (Mair, Kelly, and High, 2012: 13; see also Mathews 
2005). Under the helpful rubric of ‘strategic ignorance’, McGoey and colleagues (McGoey 
2007; Davies and McGoey, 2012) expanded the study of non-knowledge in science to the study 
of how institutions (governments, international organisations or corporations) use ignorance as 
a strategic tool of governance. When ignorance is highly strategic, it ceases to be ignorance 
and turns into deceit or denial.  
For some scholars (e.g. McGoey, 2007: 11), the social and political usefulness of 
ignorance and its generative effects go hand in hand. For others, ignorance is a ‘peculiar 
infrastructure in its own right, […] defined as a ground from which both knowledge and lack 
of knowledge come into being’ (Pedersen, 2017: 91); as such it can be fundamentally ‘non-
strategic’ (Pedersen, 2017: 89). Little attention, however, has been paid to the interplay 
between the strategic and non-strategic productions of ignorance; to how blindness moves from 
being a strategy to being praxis.2  
 Key to understanding how ignorance can be the product of deliberate and willful action 
in one instance, and a normalised ‘way of doing things’ in another, is to analyse the ways in 
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which forms of non-knowledge become associated with particular affective states.3 Amongst 
many others, these can include doubt that undermines ignorance, familiarity, hope and intimacy 
that promote acquiescence, or anger, excitement and indignation that fuel and energise willful 
blindness. Hence the next section discusses various forms of willful ignorance, from strategic 
denial, the projection of ignorance onto others, to suppressing doubt as normalised routine. 
These processes will be discussed while paying special attention to the ways in which affect 
shapes the production, fluctuation and transformation of willful blindness in Timor-Leste’s 
burgeoning oil industry.  
 
Strategic denial  
Governance of Timor-Leste’s natural resources has involved elements of strategic ignorance. 
This includes both the oil-profit-driven willful blindness of the Australian government with 
regards to human rights abuses carried out during the Indonesian occupation of East Timor 
(1975-1999), and the failure by Timor-Leste’s independent government to acknowledge the 
uncertainties involved in producing resources onshore. 4  
Construction related to the Tasi Mane project began in 2015 and is to be completed by 
2020.5 It was launched in 2011 as part of the government’s Strategic Development Plan (SDP) 
with the goal of transforming the south coast into ‘the backbone of the Timor-Leste petroleum 
industry’ (SDP 2011: 138). Plans for the project include three industrial clusters. In the Suai 
region, at the western end of the projected highway, the planned scheme stipulates the building 
of a supply base including a port and an international airport. In the area of Betano, located on 
the midpoint of the new highway, plans include an industrial park housing an oil refinery and 
a petrochemical plant. In Beaço, in the east, plans include an industrial complex for an LNG 
(Liquefied Natural Gas) plant, and a pipeline for natural gas. Moreover, there are plans for 
three ‘new cities’ to administer these projects, and a large multi-lane highway connecting the 
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three industrial clusters (SDP 2011: 139). The Ministry for Petroleum and Mineral Resources 
is the main force behind the project, and has charged the national oil company Timor-Gap with 
its implementation. This mega-scheme is envisioned to facilitate post-conflict reconstruction, 
enable economic development, and provide new employment opportunities. It has also been 
subject to severe criticism from many different angles.  
One of the main criticisms of the Tasi Mane project involved serious doubts about the 
origin and availability of oil and gas deposits to be produced in the scheme. Timor-Leste has a 
resource-sharing agreement with Australia over several offshore fields, which are however 
close to depletion (La’o Hamutuk, 2015). Studies are currently being carried out about the 
viability of onshore resources located along Timor’s south coast, however during Portuguese 
colonial times these were deemed to be economically unviable (Charlton, 2002: 352). Industry 
experts told me that it might take years until results from current surveys produce results. The 
country’s most promising oil and gas reserves, estimated to be worth more than US$40 billion, 
are located offshore in the Timor Sea and include Sunrise and Troubadour gas and condensate 
fields, collectively known as ‘Greater Sunrise’. They lie about 450 km north of Australia and 
150 km southeast of Timor-Leste and when the Tasi Mane project was initiated, these reserves 
were subject to a long-running legal dispute with Australia, connected to the question of 
boundary delimitation.  
In an interview in 2015, a senior employee of Timor-Gap was incredulous at the 
government’s proposal to go ahead with the Tasi Mane project without knowing whether the 
legal dispute with Australia would be resolved. He argued that ‘The government is doing things 
the wrong way around. They should first be doing studies to see whether we have viable 
resources, then they should be building an oil refinery and LNG plant. […] They are making 
plans to construct an LNG plant and a pipeline, but Australia might never agree to give up 
Greater Sunrise’. According to this employee, the Tasi Mane project had a massive blind-spot: 
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the country’s valuable financial resources were being invested into an oil infrastructure project 
without having certainty that the country would have legal ownership of economically viable 
oil and gas to be produced in it.  
 
<< insert Figure 1. Here  >> 
Figure 1: Contested oil and gas in the Timor Sea (map by Helder Bento)  
 
This supposed blindspot was both affective and strategic. Strategic because it presented 
a way of putting pressure on Australia with regards to the southern seabed boundary. Affective 
because this dispute evoked strong feelings of injustice and indignation amongst East Timorese 
politicians and citizens, because of its connection to the Australian government’s willful 
blindness towards human rights abuses carried out by the Indonesian military in East Timor. 
In order to put this into perspective, a brief historical excursion is warranted. 
Indonesia launched a full-scale military invasion of the Portuguese Timor in 1975, 
which lasted 24 years and led to the loss of around one quarter of the East Timorese population 
and to severe human rights abuses. Woolcott, the Australian ambassador to Jakarta, used the 
offshore resources as a main reason to plead in favour of East Timor’s ‘integration’ into 
Indonesia, arguing that it was easier to negotiate with Indonesia than with Portugal about a 
seabed border (Aditjondro, 1999: 18). In December 1978, Australia’s Foreign Minister Andrew 
Peacock controversially announced Australia’s de jure recognition of Indonesia’s annexation 
of East Timor – the only Western country to do so. Recently declassified communications show 
that the Australian (and U.S.) government ‘deliberately lied about their knowledge of 
Indonesian annexationist plans in East Timor and secretly assisted the invasion in December 
1975 to protect their economic and strategic interests’ (Galway, n.d.: 1).  
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Of course, not all members of the Australian government were truly ignorant of what 
was happening in East Timor during the Indonesian invasion, but the moral and political 
implications of this knowledge was denied. Kim McGrath found an example of this in the 
archives when examining recently declassified government cables. In 1976, a memo was sent 
by East Timor’s pro-independence party, Fretilin, to the Australian embassy in The Hague, 
describing events in East Timor under Indonesian military occupation, including the torture 
and rape of captured populations. Someone at the embassy had underlined this part and written 
in the margins, ‘Sounds like fun’ (McGrath 2017: 102). A later comment read, ‘Sounds like 
the population must be in raptures’.  
In direct contrast to the strategic ignorance of the East Timorese politicians pushing for 
the implementation of the Tasi Mane project, the scribbling by this Australian official, who 
may or may not have been ‘joking’, suggests an insensitivity of blindness to the plight of the 
Timorese population. There is no attempt to deny the facts or their conventional interpretation 
– as Cohen (2001: 7–8) describes in cases of ‘imploratory denial’ – but their psychological, 
political, or moral implications are denied and minimised. Ignorance was deliberately 
manufactured as strategic tool for economic profit. There was a clear awareness of the suffering 
endured, but a refusal to recognise it fully.  
In 2018, Timor-Leste – by then an independent country – successfully won the right to 
set the southern seabed boundary with Australia along the median line, placing the majority of 
Greater Sunrise in East Timorese sovereign waters. It was a result of a long-standing campaign 
and legal battle and presented a major success for Timor-Leste. It could have appeased some 
of the most ardent critics of the Tasi Mane project, yet disagreements erupted about the location 
for the processing of LNG from Greater Sunrise. Proponent of the project from East Timorese 
government circles insist on building an onshore LNG plant in Beaço, whilst the oil companies 
with the development rights prefer to process this in an existing LNG plant in Darwin.  
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The Tasi Mane project must hence be seen as part of a broader governmental strategy 
to force Australia’s hand in these negotiations. An East Timorese politician whom I 
interviewed in 2015 stressed that building an oil infrastructure along the south coast was a way 
of signalling to Australia that Timor-Leste was ready to develop its own oil and gas industry – 
it was a way of asserting Timor-Leste’s sovereignty.6 The willful blindness concerning the 
viability of the Tasi Mane project was part of a strategy to strengthen Timor-Leste’s bargaining 
position in negotiations with a more powerful neighbour, but it was also fuelled by a deeply 
felt sense of injustice.   
 
Epistemic disconnect  
Social disconnect facilitates implicatory denial and diminishes empathy, because it involves a 
particular way of seeing without recognising. As Honneth (2008: 59-60) has pointed out, such 
‘forgetfulness of recognition’ can be caused by reifying social practices that prevent individuals 
from recognising others as subjects. As the following two examples will show, epistemic 
disconnect can be produced by actual physical or spatial distance, or by a mental distance 
created through specific techniques of differentiation.  
Sitting in a café in Dili, Timor-Leste’s capital city, in May 2015, I became aware of 
three people at the table beside me talking loudly about the petroleum development project in 
Suai. The group consisted of two foreigners (a man and a woman) and one Timorese man who 
were discussing investment ideas in the region. The woman, charismatically directing the 
conversation, had taken a piece of scrap paper and was jotting down some drawings. ‘Here is 
the airport’, she said, casually adding another stroke to the piece of paper, ‘and this is the oil 
rig’, pointing to another section on the paper (presumably at Bayu Undan located offshore to 
the south of Suai). The group discussed plans to develop the tourist industry, most notably 
plans for an Australian cruise ship company to stop in Suai, thus oddly combining oil 
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development with tourism in one site. The woman exclaimed somewhat grandly, ‘I want a 
brewery!’ All of them laughed. ‘We could call it “Timor Beer”’. ‘We can have a restaurant 
here’, she continued, adding some more casual strokes to the sheet of paper in front of them, 
‘with traditional roofs’. The woman then proceeded to suggest that the three of them fly to Suai 
by privately hired airplane the next day to have coffee there and then return to the capital city.  
Remarkable about this conversation was the ability to disconnect the region entirely 
from the people living there – revealing a particular way of seeing. In this vision, the south 
coast quite literally became a white piece of scrap paper that could be populated with ideas and 
projects – detached from anything already in existence there. This kind of disconnect between 
local realities and the vision from above is reminiscent of James Scott’s Seeing Like a State 
(1998). Although Scott does not use the term, his analysis of how governments project their 
high modernist visions while ignoring local realities, is in many ways an examination of willful 
blindness. The corporate and government vision of Timor-Leste’s south coast (and other 
special economic zones, see Meitzner Yoder, 2015: 317) is based on the exclusion of grassroots 
knowledge and of the active participation of local residents. As Hannah Appel (2012: 439) 
reminds us (with regards to oil development in Equatorial Guinea), ‘Marketization is made 
possible through work to deny the web of sociopolitical relations required for hydrocarbon 
extraction and production, thus allowing the commodity (and the companies producing it) to 
appear as if separate from the broader social context within which they operate’. 
From a bird’s-eye perspective, local realities were reduced to the pristine image of 
‘traditional roofs’ or cultural representations of the ‘song-and-dance variety’ suitable for 
consumption by tourists (Li, 2000; Meitzner Yoder, 2015), thereby concealing how the 
expansion of the oil and tourism industries would affect people living in the region. Willful 
blindness is not an incidental by-product of these visions for development; it is an indispensable 
component.  
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The described conversation suggested not just epistemic disconnect, but – as with the 
Australian diplomats described earlier – also emotional detachment. However, the level of 
intentionality appears to be weaker in this case. While ignorance of realities on the ground 
might be part of a broader corporate strategy, the ignorance is not consciously employed as a 
geopolitical manoeuvre. The blindness of seeing like a state (corporation or investor) has 
instead become a naturalised part of the job. The infrastructure and the spatial distance between 
investors and local residents facilitate this normalised disconnect; a process of disentanglement 
that leads to the ‘intentional abdication of responsibility’ (Appel, 2012: 442). Such 
disentanglement was less straightforward for the Timorese professionals who were charged 
with implementing the Tasi Mane project and were regularly interacting with local residents. 
Here, a main technique for achieving distance was to produce ignorance, not in themselves, 
but in those affected by the project.  
On a rural stretch of the south coast, on the way to a meeting between the national oil 
company and ‘affected community’ members (kommunidade affeitadu) in 2015, we were 
overtaken by an impatient convoy of white SUVs and pickup trucks with blinking lights and 
honking horns. The posse from Timor-Gap had arrived in Suai the night before, and they were 
also making their way to the community consultation (sosialisasaun). 7  Upon their arrival, the 
young urban Timorese professionals of Timor-Gap set up a table at the open meeting hall, 
installed microphones and speakers, a front desk covered with woven cloth, and multiple 
chairs. Local residents had started to gather under the shade of a gigantic banyan tree that stood 
impressively beside the meeting hall and were observing the city folks from a safe distance. 
The local residents with their simple dress stood out sharply against the Timor-Gap employees, 
all dressed blue jeans, trainers and green or blue polo shirts.8  
The Tasi Mane project was introduced through passionate speeches in Timor-Leste’s 
national language Tetum, with charismatic Timor-Gap employees telling the audience that they 
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were lucky to have the project being implemented in their region. Lengthy presentations 
followed, providing detailed information about the project, including ‘risks and hazards’. 
Unlike the ‘one-message’ slide culture Stein (2020, this issue) describes amongst German 
management consultants whose aim it was to convince their clients to invest, slides of Timor-
Gap employees were highly complex, densely written, and contained many foreign loan words; 
some were entirely in English, a language that only few people speak along the south coast. 
They may have been aimed at impressing the audience so that they would accept the project. 
They also contained high levels of technical detail, as well as a lot of business speak, such as 
‘high skill’ and ‘low skill’, ‘flow diagrams’, ‘evaluations’, ‘pipeline right of way’, or 
‘memorandum of understanding’.9 Throughout the presentations, the highly professional 
Timor-Gap employees were clearly in control of the situation; they established their authority 
through the use of complex technology, dress, and specialist language. However, they made a 
sustained effort not to do so in a condescending way, as was evident from their tone of voice 
and their respectful interactions with the audience.  
 Using complex and inaccessible language was a recurring practice throughout the 
socialisation events I attended: authority was established by presenting dazzling information 
about the project, solidifying this effect by using phrases such as ‘regulations, standards, and 
codes’ or ‘terms of reference’ that uphold an abstract regulatory system. Consultations often 
lasted several hours and included a number of presentations by highly skilled specialists, who 
provided technical details about oil and gas extraction in general; and little information about 
the consequences the project would have for local people.  
Unlike the spatial distancing through enclaves and zoning (e.g. Appel, 2012), that easily 
takes place when oil companies are dominated by expats, the Timor Gap employees I spoke to, 
(all of which were East Timorese), stressed their closeness to the local population – both in 
interviews with me and in the ways they greeted and interacted with the affected population. 
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They were pleased that they were consulting with local people, rather than just implementing 
a project without local interaction. Nevertheless, they also actively created distance and at 
times fell into a moralising or frustrated tone of voice, especially when faced with questions 
about compensation payments for land. Many of these foreign-educated employees were proud 
of their technical knowledge and keen to appear professional. Although I do not think that they 
produced their presentations in bad faith, the technical details of the slides ended up alienating 
the audience, and had the effect of obscuring rather than illuminating the reality of the project. 
As a member of the audience who was affected by the project told me afterwards, ‘Why don’t 
they talk in a language we understand? I still don’t know what will happen to my land’. An 
older woman who had come to one of the presentations told me afterward, ‘We are ignorant 
(beik); we don’t know/understand’. Looking at the project from the perspective of those 
affected by it, yet unable to influence its implementation, the plans looked inscrutable. The 
meetings left affected communities painfully aware of their exclusion from the kind of 
education that would allow them to understand the project; the ‘socialisation’ events produced 
a feeling of ignorance in people. The consultation made people aware of their ignorance with 
regards to the technical detail of the project – and this awareness, and possibly related feeling 
of inadequacy, may have discouraged them from raising valid concerns.  
Ignorance was thus wilfully (though not strategically) produced in affected residents in 
order to advance the implementation of the project, while maintaining the impression that 
locals were consulted. The authority of Timor-Gap employees gained authority via the 
mobilisation of a stereotypical binary distinction between ‘modern’, ‘educated’ city dwellers 
and ‘backward’, ‘uneducated’ rural people – a dichotomy that is common across Southeast 
Asia. However, being ‘ignorant’ (beik, which also means ‘uneducated’ or ‘stupid’) is also 
associated with the sacred/ ritual powers of the ancestors. In contrast to outsiders associated 
with worldly affairs, ritual authorities were often ‘represented as “stupid and ignorant” (beik 
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nor bodu), fixed in place and committed to a constant vigil over rock and tree’, yet during the 
national struggle for independence, ‘stupidity has come to signify a mode of popular political 
participation in the nation’ (Traube, 2017: 51; Chua, 2009). Hence local residents’ self-
identification with ignorance might also be read as a critical commentary on the devaluation 
of their knowledge.  
Pointing out how ignorance is often invoked as a mark of ‘moral failure’ of populations 
(1993: 101), Piers Vitebsky stresses that ignorance is unstable because it is attributed to persons 
‘in the context of their relations to other persons’ (1993: 104). As the Tasi Mane community 
consultations show, it is easier to maintain one’s own blind spots if one’s interlocutors are 
defined as ignorant. The stability of willful blindness thus depends in part on the (in)stability 
of the fields of power within which it operates. The production of ignorance as a category of 
‘moral failure’ can also be used to reinforce existing inequalities.  
 
Pragmatic and affective blindness   
In July 2015, Timor-Gap, Timor-Leste’s national oil company, set up a meeting in Betano in 
order to share information about the plans to build an oil refinery there. A marquee had been 
constructed next to a house in the hamlet of Sellihassan, several meters away from the sea. It 
was a dry, hot day, and small waves were splashing gently against the shores. Many people 
were attending and not everyone could find a place under the marquee, so some attendees found 
shade under the palm trees that were covering the shoreline. A Timor-Gap employee started 
his speech about the oil refinery by invoking a powerful visual image of the overwhelming 
beauty of the night sky. He told the audience that he had slept in the highlands the night before. 
In the evening, he had looked up into the sky and saw it alight with hundreds of stars. On a 
large screen, he projected a photograph of a glittering oil refinery full of lights, continuing, 
‘When the oil refinery is built here, I will not just look up and see stars – I will also look down 
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to the sea, and I will see this place will be lit up like the stars in the sky’. What followed was a 
passionate speech telling the audience about the development the refinery would bring. 
Metaphors of light and darkness were frequently evoked to signify progress and modernity.  
The day before, I had interviewed employees of Timor-Gap – including the man who 
had invoked images of the night skies in Betano. During the interview, it was explained that a 
pipeline would accompany the highway from Suai to Betano. Oil would be brought by boat to 
Suai and then pumped to Betano, where it would be refined; subsequently, it would be brought 
back by pipe to Suai, where it would be exported. ‘If the oil refinery is to be built in Betano, 
why not bring crude oil directly by boat to Betano?’ I asked, remembering some of the concerns 
and fears local residents had about the idea of a highway and pipeline going through their fields 
and settlements. One of the men responded (in English), ‘Precisely. I had the same question… 
but we are just implementing the plans that the government has made. You have to ask the 
government this question; we can’t tell you why. … I am just doing my job’. Another employee 
added, ‘It’s a political decision. We are just here to set the terms of reference’.  
In other interviews with well-educated and highly skilled professionals working in 
Timor-Leste’s oil and gas industry, this pattern re-emerged. Employees would identify 
problems with the Tasi Mane project, and several of the people I spoke to did reflect critically 
on what they were doing; they were worried about some aspects of their work, they were keen 
to distinguish between the land acquisitions for the project and land grabs during the Indonesian 
occupation, and they really wanted the project to benefit local people. Timor-Gap employees I 
interviewed were thoughtful, empathetically identified with local residents and were concerned 
with their wellbeing. They critically reflected on and expressed doubt about the benefits of the 
Tasi Mane project. Yet when it came to moving the project along, many of them sidelined this 
doubt. Swept up in the hopeful enthusiasm of the speeches during socialisations, they were 
able to push critical reflections aside. One might say that some of these employees were in a 
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‘divided state’ (Tuckett, 2015: 62), where ambivalent or conflicting thoughts can reside in the 
mind, without having to be realised or activated in crucial moments. It is also possible that the 
process of sidelining doubt itself ended up strengthening their conviction and dedication to the 
cause of development (cf. Pelkmans, 2013: 27). There are rhythms to willful blindness, and the 
people I spoke with moved in and out of willful blindness with varying degrees of 
intentionality.   
As mentioned earlier, a key concern raised by Timor-Gap employees with regards to 
the Tasi Mane project related to the source of oil and gas due to the uncertainty of onshore 
viability and legal uncertainty regarding the offshore sources at the time the project was 
initiated. One high-level professional involved in the consultation for the refinery in Betano 
told me that he had no idea where the crude oil for the refinery would come from. He added: 
‘I ask myself where the oil is going to come from. But we are just here to implement the 
government’s plans’. ‘The government’ became a kind of disembodied entity – a higher 
authority to whom ultimate responsibility for the success of the project could be attributed.  
This issue also arose during the consultation in Betano, when an NGO worker critically 
asked: ‘Recent studies indicate that Bayu Undan is nearly depleted.10 Why are you building a 
refinery here if we are running out of oil?’ In response to this question, a high-level Timor-Gap 
employee gave a passionate speech about how it was the company’s national duty to develop 
the country. The rumours that Timor-Leste was running out of oil were lies that ‘foreigners 
were spreading’. The employee added, ‘People who say we don’t have enough oil do not want 
us to develop’. The atmosphere in the room was tense, and people seemed to listen with strained 
enthusiasm about the way this speaker connected the oil refinery to Timor-Leste’s struggle for 
independence. References were made to the fact that Australia had been spying on the East 
Timorese government during the oil negotiations in 2005. People were asked to give up their 
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land as a nationalist sacrifice (see also Bovensiepen 2018). Even if only temporarily, these 
arguments seemed to erase the doubts and concerns of the audience and speakers alike.11  
 One way in which petroleum professionals side-lined their doubts about the Tasi Mane 
project was to refer to somewhat formulaic phrases like ‘doing their job’ and attributing 
ultimate authority over the project to the government. Another strategy to produce ignorance, 
eliminate doubts, and avoid scrutiny of the project was to appropriate legitimate critiques of 
Australia’s foreign policies and turn this critique toward those sceptical of the project in their 
own country.  
 In speeches and interactions with the local population, critics of the project, including 
NGOs, were accused of collaborating with foreign powers to prevent progress, modernity, and 
development in the country. In these cases, blindness was produced not by coldly following 
administrative routines, but through passionate speeches and the excitement and euphoria that 
these group events were able to generate. There is a ‘pulsating quality’ (Pelkmans, 2017: 122) 
to willful blindness, which can be energised through effervescent moments of collective 
sociality or through confrontation with a common enemy. The pragmatic ignorance of ‘doing 
one’s job’ received occasional boosts through moments of affective collective solidarity.  
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Conclusion: on the affective banality of willful blindness  
 
This article has shown that the production of ignorance depends on the level of affective and 
epistemic disconnect and the degree of willfulness involved. The most stable form of willful 
blindness described in this article involved Australia’s foreign politics, combining a high 
degree of strategic willfulness with a high level of disconnect or ‘blindness’. This 
contemptuous ‘ignorance’ ironically signalled having knowledge, knowledge that was being 
denied for strategic purposes. When willfulness was less strategic, we also found willful 
blindness to be less stable. This was particularly clear amongst Timor-Gap employees, who 
sidelined their concerns when interacting with local communities, yet in other situations 
reflected with concern about the feasibility and effect of the project. These less stable forms of 
willful ignorance required energising boosts to be sustained; boosts that were provided during 
euphoric speeches by national or corporate leaders, and through the sense of unity created by 
identifying a common enemy such as Australia. Finally, when ignorance and passivity was 
produced in others, willful blindness took on a dual character. During the so-called 
socialisation events, the Timor-Gap employees were able to control the situation and establish 
their expert authority, giving presentations that produced a sense of ignorance in the very 
people they set out to inform. Implementing the Tasi Mane project required oil-company 
employees to be blind to the effects of their actions while simultaneously blinding local 
residents to the full details of the plans they were set to implement.  
Hence, this article has identified three different forms of willful blindness. The first 
refers to a process of detachment by which aspects of reality become or remain ‘invisible’; the 
second refers to producing ignorance in others as a means of obfuscation; and the third refers 
to a sidelining or marginalisation of uncomfortable knowledge through a process of reasoning, 
routines and collective solidarity. Much of the literature on strategic ignorance focuses on the 
first kind, and less attention has so far been paid to the dynamics of the second and third types. 
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By broadening our scope and paying attention to these other forms of wilful blindness, this 
article has illuminated the dynamics of ignorance that are not part of a strategic master-plan, 
but become part of the naturalised or ‘banal’ ways of following bureaucratic procedures. The 
selective application of recognition and the oscillation between epistemic and emotive 
entanglement and disconnect, illustrates that there is no sharp dichotomy, but a dynamic 
interaction between strategic and non-strategic forms of willful blindness.  
Although the literature on strategic ignorance emphasises the dynamic relationship 
between knowledge and ignorance, it does not pay much attention to the factors that animate 
such dynamism, nor is there much reflection on the more ambivalent and unstable forms of 
ignorance. By looking at the fluctuations of intention and ignorance, we get a more nuanced 
picture of the oil industry and the kind of dynamics that underlie the manufacture and 
maintenance of willful blindness. Hence, the process via which willful blindness becomes 
institutionalised (its ‘banality’) is not necessarily characterised by an absence of emotion but 
can be enabled by affective states, such as ascribing responsibility to higher powers, identifying 
a common enemy, or wrestling with, overcoming or sidelining doubt.  
The gradually growing interest in studying resource elites produces a conundrum of 
whether to describe experts’ deliberations (or lack of deliberation) about the context and 
consequences of their industry as ethical, deceitful, or simply pragmatic. The concept of willful 
blindness is helpful here because it allows us to move beyond a mere focus on people’s own 
rationalisations and pay critical attention to the political and economic entanglements of willful 
ignorance within the geopolitical contexts in which it emerges. Elucidating how ignorance is 
produced and policed helps us to bridge the gap between political economy approaches that 
emphasise the disruptive impact on resource abundance (e.g. Karl 1997), on the one hand, and 
anthropological approaches that highlight the social logics and ethical evaluations of main 
actors involved (e.g. Smith and High 2017), on the other. 
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Hannah Arendt used the term ‘the banality of evil’ not to describes Eichmann’s actions 
or the ideology underlying them, but to ‘a specific quality of mind’ (Villa, 2000: 74). This 
quality of mind was ‘thoughtlessness’ (Gedankenlosigkeit) and a certain ‘remoteness from 
reality’ (Villa, 2000: 75) rather than depravity or wickedness of character. A crucial insight 
here is that the absence of thought can itself be harmful (or even evil). Thoughtlessness, it 
strikes me, is not the absence of thought, but a shift of vision whereby the focus on bureaucratic 
procedures entails the sidelining of reflections on the human cost and consequence. As the 
examples in this article have shown, the ‘pragmatism’ of resource elites presents a form of 
thoughtlessness.  
The focus on ‘doing one’s job’, following procedure, or stressing the limitations of 
one’s own ability to act tended to lead to an ignorance of the social and political consequences 
of extraction. Kirsch (2020, this issue) similarly describes how the focus on ‘scientific 
objectivity’ by an environmental sociologist made him blind to the social and political 
consequences of his research as a consultant for Exxon. Rajak (2020, this issue) highlights how 
‘techno-optimism’ allows extractive companies to rebrand themselves as proponents of 
sustainability without changing their business model. The solidarity produced by appeals to the 
resistance struggle against Indonesia, the identification of a common enemy and pragmatic 
rationalistions allowed East Timorese extractive elites to sideline their doubts about the 
viability of the Tasi Mane project. The oscillation between a work routine and more 
emotionally charged collective gatherings can foster willful blindness and may lead to its 
institutionalisation. All these examples show that thoughtlessness is not – as Hannah Arendt 
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1 This article is based on 8 months of fieldwork in Timor-Leste (Dili, Suai and Betano) between 2015 and 2017, 
which included interviews with affected community members, civil society, oil industry representatives and local 
and national politicians, as well as participant observation in a series of community consultations that took place 
in 2015 and 2016.  
2 An interesting and important exception is Anand’s (2015) discussion of the interplay between awareness and 
ignorance about water leakage in Mumbai.  
3 Cognitive neuroscientists and psychologists have emphasised how knowledge is encoded through ‘somatic 
markers’ that shape decision-making processes (Tuckett, 2015:1). It is likely that non-knowledge and emotions 
are similarly interlinked.  
4 I use ‘Timor-Leste’ for the period after 1999 and ‘East Timor’ for the period prior to 1999.  
5 In Timor-Leste’s national language Tetum, the south sea is called tasi mane (‘male sea’, in contrast to the 
‘female sea’, tasi feto, on the north coast).  
6 In interviews with leading politicians involved in the Tasi Mane project, they argued that the new infrastructure 
could additionally be used to process imported hydrocarbon resources. Furthermore, frequent allusions were made 
to as-yet-undiscovered oil and gas abundance, both onshore and offshore.  
7 The term used for these consultations is sosialisasaun (Tetum). It is supposed to be a neutral term describing a 
participatory process of information distribution. However, these events often end up being much closer to the 
connotations of the term ‘socialisation’ in English. Namely, they are about getting people to accept policies rather 
than merely distributing information; they are essentially a form of public relations. It is possible that the term’s 
use in Timor-Leste is inspired by the Indonesian sosialisasi, a common government practice in Indonesia which 
Elmhirst et al. (2015: 7) describe as ‘a process whereby people are informed of and persuaded (sometimes forced) 
to accept policies made higher up in the government’.  
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8 The audience, which consisted largely of Mambai and Tetum speakers from the region, was predominantly male 
(55 people in total, of which three were women). Of the eleven Timor Gap employees, two were women (including 
one female engineer), and whilst the employees were from areas across Timor-Leste, their educational status 
distinguished them from the audience, which consisted mainly of subsistence farmers.  
9 There are over 16 different languages spoken in Timor-Leste, but the official languages are Tetum and 
Portuguese. Although younger generations learn Portuguese in school and the educated members of the oldest 
generations might still know Portuguese from their time in school during the Portuguese colonial period, many 
citizens between the ages of 20 and 50 were educated in Indonesian. This linguistic complexity poses a real 
challenge to trans-local communication, not least when communicating about technical issues.  
10 Bayu Undan is an offshore gas and condensate field in production since 2005; profits are divided between 
Timor-Leste and Australia.   
11 Blaming foreign influence and meddling is a common political tactic throughout the region, especially in 
Malaysia and Indonesia.  
